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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, transboundary water management has come to play a key role both in global 
environmental politics debates and in the shaping of international development policies, specifically 
in the Global South. As a consequence, a growing body of literature in the framework of critical 
hydropolitics has emerged reflecting on the role that power, discourses, and strategies play in 
shaping transboundary water policies and in influencing riparian relations. The focus on a state-
centric perspective, however, often has led to neglect of the role of international development actors 
in shaping these policies. Through a critical application of the Circle of Hydro-Hegemony (CHH) 
and ethnographic qualitative field research in borderlands, this contribution aims to analyse how the 
establishment of a development initiative known as the Chu-Talas Commission, supported by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and other donors, has influenced and 
shaped transboundary water politics in the Talas waterscape, which is shared by Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan. The evidence shows that despite the international narration of the Chu-Talas 
Commission as a success story for water cooperation in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, through the 
deployment of both material and bargaining power strategies, has been able to shape UNECE 
development policies in its favour, impose its agenda on Kyrgyzstan, and emerge as the basin 
hydro-hegemon. 
 
Keywords: Hydropolitics; Circle of Hydro-Hegemony; Development Initiatives; Talas Borderlands; 
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Introduction 
Over the last few decades, transboundary water management has gained a key role in international 
relations between riparian states. Several rivers – particularly in the Middle East and in Central and 
Southeast Asia – have assumed a transboundary nature due to the political and border 
reconfigurations linked to the dismantlement of the colonial order and the end of the Cold War. 
Transboundary water management processes have a complex political nature since they are subject 
to processes of negotiation, control, utilization, and allocation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008, 
2013).  
A growing body of literature recognises the importance of a critical approach to hydropolitics 
(among others, Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Warner and Zeitoun, 2008; Julien, 2012; Menga, 2016b) as 
a way to further our understanding of the role that power and discourses play in influencing 
international water relations and in shaping transboundary water policies. By taking power 
asymmetries into account, scholars have revealed the inequalities that often mark transboundary 
water relations, in spite of outward claims of cooperation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Zeitoun et 
al., 2011).  
This seems to be the case with the Talas transboundary waterscape1, a river basin shared by 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan that is generally singled out as a success story in transboundary 
cooperation (UNECE, 2011a; Libert, 2014) in the otherwise conflictual regional political setting in 
Central Asia (Wegerich, 2008). In particular, the establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission – a 
bilateral body created in 2006 to facilitate water resources allocation in the Chu and Talas 
waterscapes shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – has been hailed as the way forward in water 
cooperation in Central Asia (UNECE, 2011a; Libert and Lipponen, 2012). The aim of this paper is 
to critically examine water politics in the Talas waterscape and argue that, in spite of their 
significant efforts, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and other 
donors such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United 
Nations Commission Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) were unsuccessful in their objective of imposing an 
international development discourse based on the principle of benefit-sharing, as well as in their 
attempt to balance state power between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The reasons for this, it will be 
argued, are to be found in the political strategies implemented by Kazakh water authorities at 
different scales, which effectively used their power to hamper the activities of UNECE, OSCE, 
UNESCAP and ADB and get Kazakhstan a more powerful position and a more favourable water 
allocation than the one to which the country is entitled based on existing bilateral agreements.  
Transboundary water politics in the Talas transboundary waterscape will be analysed using the 
hydro-hegemonic approach proposed by Menga (2016a), the Circle of Hydro-Hegemony 
(hereinafter CHH), an analytical framework devised to understand how basin riparians use different 
forms of power to maintain, or counter, hegemony. The CHH has been chosen, among other 
reasons, for its emphasis on water politics as evolving political processes, something that enables 
the adoption of a broader perspective in the analysis of transboundary water interactions, one that, 
                                                 
1The concept of waterscape has increasingly emerged over the last decade in research that discusses the interactions 
between water, power and socio-political dynamics (Swyngedouw, 1997; Loftus, 2009; Budds and Hinojosa, 2012).  
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as it will be argued, allows examining the layered nature of hegemonic struggles. This is relevant to 
the case of the Talas waterscape, where the nature of political negotiations has considerably evolved 
since the early 2000s, particularly because of the increasing role played by international 
development actors, and most prominently UNECE. The Talas waterscape was firstly regulated 
through a Soviet inter-republican agreement signed in 1983, almost a decade after the development 
of its main hydraulic infrastructures. These included the Kirov reservoir, its canals network and the 
pumping systems, which were set in place to face the inter-republican water issues emerged at the 
end of the 1970s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing tensions over water 
between independent Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, a new agreement was signed in 2000 (Wegerich, 
2008a; Dukhovny and De Schutter, 2011). UNECE, OSCE, and UNESCAP promoted the 
establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission as part of a wave of international development 
initiatives to reform and restructure water politics in the Global South and post-socialist states that 
began in 2002  (Lipponen and Libert, 2012; Libert, 2014). The Commission, which was designed to 
support and strengthen Kyrgyz-Kazakh interstate water cooperation, was established in 2006, 
setting in place a new institutional structure formed by members of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz water 
authorities (Wegerich, 2008b; UNECE, 2011b).  Through the application of the CHH to the Talas 
waterscape, this paper contributes to the literature exploring the role of power in transboundary 
water politics and the influence of international development initiatives in shaping these politics and 
riparian relations (see, among others, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun, 2008; Cascao, 2008, 
2009; Menga and Mirumachi, 2016; Zinzani, 2017). 
This paper also responds to Furlong’s (2008) incisive argument that most hydro-hegemony analyses 
suffer from a state-centric approach and do not really engage with issues of scale. As Sneddon and 
Fox (2012) observed, “a variety of agents associated with spatial scales and organizational levels 
ranging from the global to the local” may shape transboundary waterscapes. The hydro-hegemony 
scholarship has generally ignored these agents. Therefore, and with the aim of critically contributing 
to this scholarship, the present study will also draw on critical water geography to avoid the 
territorial trap and illustrate how scalar differences can bring constrains and limitations to the use of 
power. Despite considerable efforts aimed at promoting cooperation between riparian states in 
different transboundary waterscapes, such as for instance in the Nile (Nile Basin Initiative), in the 
Mekong (Mekong River Commission), and in the Indus (Indus Water Treaty), little research has 
focused on the analysis of international development policies and on borderlands hydropolitics 
(Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Mustafa, 2007; Cascao, 2009; Suhardiman et al., 2012). Thus, by taking 
on the concepts of waterscape and borderlands, the use of a multi-scalar approach within the CHH 
and a critical reflection on international development initiatives, the present study aims to provide a 
novel and innovative contribution to critical hydropolitics, moving forward the hydro-hegemony 
literature. In addition to broadening this focus, this paper seeks to extend our understanding of the 
political processes around water sharing in Central Asia, a topic that has received scant attention in 
the research literature. Numerous studies have examined water politics in the region, but have 
focused predominantly on issues related to the desiccation of the Aral Sea (Spoor, 1998; 
Vinogradov, 2001; Micklin, 2007), the inability of the Central Asian republics to find a solution to 
regional water problems (Klotzli, 1997; Micklin, 2002; Heltzer, 2003; Wegerich, 2008), the role of 
water and climate change in triggering interstate conflicts (Smith, 1995; Krutov and Spoor, 2003; 
Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012), the coexistence of conflict and cooperation (Elhance, 1997; 
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Weinthal, 2006; Allouche, 2007), and the implementation politics of international development 
initiatives (Sehring, 2009; Bichsel, 2009; Zinzani, 2015). 
With all the above in mind, this paper sets out to provide a novel analysis of water politics in 
Central Asia while providing a constructive critique to the hydro-hegemony scholarship. This is 
done by placing the spotlight on Kazakhstan, a country that discussions of regional water politics 
have generally overlooked in favour of attention to Uzbekistan (arguably the region’s hydro-
hegemon) and to Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s ambitious hydropower development plans (Menga, 
2014). The paper illustrates that the image of Kazakhstan as a mediating force in regional water 
politics, along with that of President Nursultan Nazarbayev as a benevolent regional leader who 
managed to bring its country to the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 (Isaacs, 2010), does not 
necessarily illuminate its bilateral water relations with Kyrgyzstan. The paper also reflects on the 
role of initiatives promoted by non-state actors, such as UNECE, UNESCAP, OSCE, and ADB, to 
assess the extent to which development actors can actually influence transboundary water politics in 
the Global South. The next section gives a brief overview of the CHH and of the relevance of the 
concepts of power and hegemony to understanding transboundary water politics and international 
development policies. The third section discusses international development initiatives in Central 
Asia and introduces the Talas waterscape and its institutional background, while the fourth section 
applies the CHH to the case-study and discusses the findings that emerged from this analysis. 
Finally, the fifth section concludes the paper, identifying suggestions for future research.  
 
1. Critical Hydropolitics, the CHH and Water Development Policies 
This study builds on the body of literature that emphasises the role of power, power asymmetries, 
and discourses to advance the notion of a ‘critical hydropolitics’ (Sneddon and Fox, 2006). Zeitoun 
and Warner’s (2006) Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH) was the first structured contribution 
to hydropolitics that focused on how power shapes transboundary water relations. The FHH draws 
on Lukes’s (1974) dimensions of power and on the Gramscian notion of hegemony to provide an 
analytical framework based on three pillars – riparian position, power, and exploitation potential – 
which serve as an explanation for power asymmetries in a river basin. In a critical hydropolitical 
approach that examines the influence of power on transboundary water relations, discursive 
framings can play an important role in determining the outcome of interstate negotiations. Menga 
and Mirumachi (2016: 373), have for instance illustrated that the “analysis of the discursive and 
ideological dimensions of power, or 'soft' power, in particular, enables insights to strategies of water 
control under conditions of power asymmetries between basin states”. 
The FHH has been recently reconceptualised by Menga (2016a: 410), who argued that the “FHH 
offers extremely useful insights to the understanding of interstate relations, but does not explicitly 
show that hegemony and not power is its central element”. According to Menga, the concept of 
hydro-hegemony – which he defined as “the success of a basin riparian in imposing a discourse, 
preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status-quo” – and not that of power 
should be central if we are to understand the struggle for hegemony in an international river basin. 
Menga (2016a) therefore placed the concept of hydro-hegemony at the centre of an analytical 
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structure to illustrate how various forms of power interact and are connective in the function of 
hegemony (Figure 1). 
The CHH is structured around three forms of power: i) material power, which includes a riparian’s 
position, the size of its territory and population, and its economic means, military might, and 
structural capacities (such as the ability to realise a large scale hydraulic infrastructure); ii) 
bargaining power, which denotes a riparian’s ability to influence negotiations and offer incentives to 
comply with its will and set a political agenda by deciding which issues should be discussed and 
(perhaps more importantly) which ones should be ignored; and iii) ideational (or discursive) power, 
which refers to the ability to impose on others a sanctioned discourse2 and an ideology. Both 
bargaining and ideational power are part of the broader category of ‘soft’ power, while material 
power corresponds to ‘hard’ power, with the former being covert and more sophisticated, and the 
latter being more visible and concrete.  
While we are, in general, espousing a hydro-hegemony perspective, we decided to specifically 
adopt the CHH for its central emphasis on a neo-Gramscian approach to water politics. Gramsci’s 
(1975) understanding of politics in terms of becoming (divenire) is analytically relevant to the study 
of the forces and the continuous processes behind transboundary water politics and to the 
examination of the layered nature of hegemonic struggles. Furthermore, the CHH hints at a fluid 
understanding of power, setting the basis for a different perspective on the complex relationship of 
forces operating in a transboundary waterscape. However, even though this implies that the way 
power is used can theoretically vary according to the setting, time, and level under scrutiny, it is less 
clear how it varies in the real world. Moreover, the ways in which scales can influence the use of 
power has received little attention within the hydro-hegemony scholarship. This is a compelling 
absence, as attending to scalar differences, we argue, can add analytical depth to analysis of hydro-
hegemony. In this we follow research from the hydropolitics literature such as Warner (2008; 2011), 
which looked at hegemony as a layered phenomenon and illustrated the influence of different 
stakeholders at different levels of water‐ related interactions. Menga (2017) advanced the notion of 
the ‘hydropolis’ to illustrate how ruling elites politically construct a large dam as a foreign policy 
matter, thus shifting its related discourses from the local to the global. Zeitoun et al. (2013) focused 
on multiple spatial scales of hegemony in the Jordan River, while Mirumachi (2015) looked at how 
agency functions across scales in transboundary water politics.  
In parallel, critical water geographers have extensively explored the role of scale in water politics 
and governance. Akhter (2015; 2016) has for instance observed how large-scale water 
infrastructures and the reliability of water measurements strongly influenced the work of water 
technocrats in the Indus Basin. Harris and Alatout (2010) illustrated the key role of scalar 
negotiations and constructions of freshwater in the national consolidation of Israel and Turkey, 
while Sneddon and Fox (2012) shed light on multi-scalar water governance policies and discourses 
in the Mekong River. Mustafa (2007) analysed water and conflict dynamics at the sub-national scale 
in the Indus Basin, and Cohen and Bakker (2014) developed the concept of the ‘eco-scalar fix’ to 
                                                 
2 Anthony Turton defines a ‘sanctioned’ discourse within hydropolitics as ‘the prevailing or dominant discourse that has 
been legitimised by the discursive élite within the water sector at any one moment in time. It represents what may be 
said, who may say it and how it may be interpreted, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant belief system or 
paradigm’ (Turton, 2002). 
6 
 
understand the interplay between the scalar politics of environmental governance and social 
constructions of ecological scales. Recent work by Norman et al. (2015) has also revealed that the 
introduction of scalar debates into discussions on water governance significantly advances both 
governance studies and scalar theory. With its emphasis on scale, power, and ideology, this critical 
water geography literature enables us to move the CHH forward, with the underlying assumption 
that deliberations (and policies) on water are essentially deliberations (and challenges) of the 
politics of scale. Such an approach opens up new avenues to the study of how actors across scales 
might use different forms of power differently, thus shaping transboundary water relations as well 
as the strategies the hydro-hegemon adopts.  
Therefore, in this paper we will contribute to both the hydro-hegemony and water geography 
scholarship by offering original insights about how countries wield power in a transboundary 
waterscape through a multi-layered analysis that pays attention to scalar differences. The concepts 
of waterscape and borderlands will increase the hydro-hegemony scholarship, bringing in new 
dimensions of theoretical innovations by examining the role and practices of borderlands state 
institutions and communities in shaping power interactions and related complex dynamics. Within 
this perspective, an application of the CHH to the Talas waterscape will allow us to understand the 
hidden mechanisms and the discursive strategies Kazakhstan employed to hamper the efforts of 
international organisations such as UNECE, OSCE, UNESCAP, and ADB, and emerge as the basin 
hydro-hegemon. 
An ethnographic qualitative approach is well-suited to this study’s goals. Data were collected in the 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz Talas waterscape borderlands (Dzhambul province, Kazakhstan and Talas 
province, Kyrgyzstan), in August and September 2015. We conducted semi-structured interviews, 
open discussions, and semi-formal and informal talks with members of the Chu-Talas Commission; 
members of state, province, and district water authorities; national and international experts; heads 
and members of water users associations (WUAs); and farmers. Data collection focused on the role 
of the Commission and on Kazakh and Kyrgyz water authorities, their interactions at both interstate 
and borderlands levels, and their discourses, as well as on management and practices of borderlands 
transboundary infrastructures. This analysis allowed us to combine a joint top-down – bottom-up 
perspective to disentangle development initiatives and riparian states power interactions, 
specifically the role of Kazakhstan in influencing the Chu-Talas Commission. The focus on 
borderlands also enabled us to extricate Kyrgyz-Kazakh water relations, practices, issues and 
tensions. This brought to surface the strategies that the Kazakh hydraulic bureaucracy deployed to 
influence negotiations, undermine Kyrgyz demands, and emerge as the hydro-hegemon at the inter-
state level3. 
Over the last three decades, global environmental politics and water policies sponsored by 
international development actors have been influenced by the global discourse on sustainable 
development, good governance, and participatory approaches in decision-making processes. 
However, these politics and policies have also focused on water resources commodification, 
liberalization, and state withdrawal, influenced by a neoliberal approach (Ferguson, 1990; 
                                                 
3 For this case study, borderlands consist of an area measuring approximately 15 kilometres from north to south, and 20 
kilometres from west to east. This area is divided by the border (which lies west-east) and is characterised by cross-
border small canals, streams and natural springs. 
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Swyngedouw, 1997; Bakker, 2003; Cornwall and Brook, 2005; Molle, 2008; Molle et al., 2009; 
Budds and Sultana, 2013). 
According to this global discourse and linked processes of water resources management 
reconfiguration, since the mid-1990s several international development organisations have started to 
support this approach in the countries of the Global South through the formulation of development 
initiatives and projects. These initiatives, driven by the World Bank, United Nations agencies, the 
United States Agency for International Development, and the Asian Development Bank, among 
others, have had a multi-perspective nature, aimed at supporting and orienting water sector national 
reforms, institutional changes, international water policies implementation (Irrigation Management 
Transfer [IMT] and Integrated Water Resources Management [IWRM]), and the design of interstate 
treaties in transboundary waterscapes (Allan, 2003; UNESCAP, OSCE and UNECE, 2006; Biswas, 
2008; Molle, 2008; UNECE, 2011a; Budds and Sultana, 2013; Zinzani, 2015, 2017). 
However,  the impact of these development initiatives has been questioned by several scholars, who 
argued the depoliticised nature of these measures, and claimed that they have supported and 
transformed national institutional structures, hydrosocial relations, and linked power 
reconfigurations at multiple levels in the Global South (Loftus, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2009; Budds 
and Sultana, 2013). Others point to how narratives and discourses constructed around a global and 
broad consensus over the concept of sustainable development and buzzwords such as 
empowerment, accountability, and resources security have framed these initiatives as a way of 
hiding their power dimension (Ferguson, 1998; Cornwall and Brook, 2005).  
Reflecting on these dynamics and on the influence of international development organisations in 
supporting initiatives and promoting cooperation agreements in transboundary waterscapes in the 
Global South, it emerges that neither the FHH nor the CHH have considered the potential role of 
development actors (together with their policies and narratives) in influencing power dynamics in 
transboundary water politics. Debating the concept of hegemony, several scholars (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995; Bakker, 1999; Goldman, 2004; Furlong, 2006) have argued that the ideology and 
discursive power of development initiatives have gained a hegemonic role in water politics 
replacing states and their national powers. This suggests an international discourse on transboundary 
water management could strongly influence riparian states and prevail on national interests. 
Furthermore, the CHH has exclusively focused on a national and state-centric perspective without 
considering the potential role of borderlands state institutions and communities in shaping power 
interactions and related complex dynamics. Thus, it is significant to use the CHH to also analyse 
how both borderlands state and non-state actors can influence multi-dimensional power interactions 
among riparian states. 
 
2. Development Initiatives in Central Asia and the Talas transboundary waterscape 
The collapse of the Soviet Union deeply reconfigured the regional context of water resources 
management in Central Asia. It created five independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – all of which share the Aral Sea basin water resources. 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the institutional water framework inherited from the Soviet Union 
was at risk and various international development organisations identified the region as an area of 
potential crisis because of water resources division (Wegerich, 2006; Dukhovny and De Schutter, 
2011). But the governments of the Central Asian republics agreed to maintain the Soviet inter-
republican water framework for the two transboundary main rivers, Syr-Darja and Amu-Darja, 
formalised in the 1980s, soon after gaining independence in 1991. The interstate basin agencies, 
BVO Syr-Darja and BVO Amu-Darja, continued their operations (Spoor and Krutov, 2003). All 
five Central Asian states signed an agreement to ensure cooperation in joint management, use, and 
protection of interstate water resources and established the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination (ICWC) as a joint authority, strengthening the international framework in 1992 
(Wegerich, 2006; Dukhovny and De Schutter, 2011). However, lack of institutional coordination, 
power asymmetries, and conflicting water demand between upstream and downstream states led to 
the rise of regional tensions. 
In parallel, Central Asian states also conducted water sector reforms at the national level, in relation 
to the decollectivisation of state agriculture, characterised by different paths and approaches, more 
or less oriented towards decentralisation and liberalisation (Wegerich, 2006; Sehring, 2009; Zinzani, 
2015). In the mid-1990s, development organisations such as the WB, ADB, USAID, UNDP, and the 
Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), began promoting development initiatives based on IWRM 
and IMT concepts (Dukhovny and De Schutter, 2011; Zinzani, 2015). Their objective was to 
influence national water resources politics and balance and guide heterogeneous reform paths. 
These measures resembled in other regions of the Global South, including the Middle East, 
Southwest, and Southeast Asia. In the context of transboundary water management, international 
development initiatives, based on the UN Watercourse Convention (1997) and on the UNECE 
Water Convention (1992-2013) and sponsored since the 2000s, have also embodied principles of 
IWRM (UNECE, 2011a). 
However, as several scholars have argued, these development policies in Central Asia also had the 
objective of a structural adjustment of the institutional, economic, and political context through the 
support of market deregulation, liberalization, resources commodification, and privatization, leading 
to a rollback of the state, ruling hydraulic bureaucracies, and linked powers (Molle et al., 2009; 
Bichsel, 2009; Sehring, 2009; Zinzani, 2015). A focus on development policies and related 
bargaining and discursive powers linked to the CHH framework is relevant to critically disentangle 
international development organisations’ influence in Central Asian transboundary water politics. 
 
2.1 An Overview of the Talas Waterscape 
The concept of waterscape has emerged over the last decade in research that discusses the 
interactions between water, power, socio-political dynamics and technology (Swyngedouw, 1997, 
2004; Bakker, 2003; Budds, 2009). The waterscape is not merely a territory within which water 
flows. It is also a produced socio-natural entity in which water’s material flow determines and 
shapes social power (Swyngedouw, 2004; Loftus, 2009; Budds and Hinojosa, 2012). It represents a 
socio-spatial product, a materialized entity characterised by power, socio-political interactions, and 
physical-environmental dynamics. In addition, waterscapes comprise the assemblage of a wide 
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range of water flows, water infrastructure, internal and external institutions and authorities, 
everyday formal and informal practices, political discourses, and narratives which produce, and are 
produced by, power dynamics (Swyngedouw, 2009; Budds, 2009). Therefore, according to our 
analysis, the concept of waterscape seems appropriate in order to shed light on interactions between 
different forms of power and interstate management of water resources and infrastructures. In 
Central Asia, climatic and environmental conditions have led to the development of waterscapes 
since ancient times by different empires and political orders through the construction of hydraulic 
infrastructures such as irrigation schemes and reservoirs. In modern times the material reification of 
waterscapes has occurred during the Soviet hydraulic mission from the 1950s to the end of the 
1980s to design new irrigated areas for monoculture cotton production (Wittfogel, 1957; Molle et 
al., 2009; Bichsel, 2009; Zinzani, 2015).  
As part of this process, the development of the Talas transboundary waterscape began in the 1970s 
during the Soviet hydraulic mission. The socialist ideal of adapting steppes and deserts to the 
development of the Soviet society drove a belief in the human conquest and transformation of 
nature that inspired this socio-political and technical process. Shared by Kyrgyzstan upstream and 
Kazakhstan downstream, the Talas River (661 kilometres) originates in the Kyrgyz central Tian-
Shan Mountains, flows towards Kazakhstan, and vanishes, due to water diversion and irrigation 
uses, in the Moinkum steppe in the Dzhambul province of Kazakhstan. The reification of the 
waterscape, specifically the central and downstream part, occurred during 1973-1975 through the 
construction of the Kirov reservoir, situated in Kyrgyzstan approximately 15 kilometres upstream of 
the Kazakh border. Commissioned by Soviet water authorities, the reservoir was built to control and 
regulate the flow of the Talas River to supply the Kyrgyz and Kazakh central and downstream parts 
of the waterscape (Krutov and Spoor, 2006; Wegerich, 2008). Since the mid-1970s, other canals, 
connected to the reservoir and the river, have been designed to enlarge the waterscape and allow the 
development of state and collective farms and new irrigated areas. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, an international border divided the Talas waterscape; decollectivisation processes and the 
implementation of diverse national and local land and water reform politics supported by Kyrgyz 
and Kazakh governments transformed and reconfigured it (Figure 2). Furthermore, the 
establishment of water users associations (WUAs), in particular in Kyrgyzstan, led to relevant 
changes regarding hydraulic infrastructures operation and maintenance (hereinafter O&M). The 
appearance of informal practices and arrangements between farmers on the sides of the border 
transformed the management of small transboundary canals and streams. These heterogeneous 
institutional, political, and social changes led to relevant transformations of the Talas waterscape. 
 
2.2 Talas Transboundary Interstate Relations and the Establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission 
During Soviet rule, in the framework of inter-republican agreements, a regulation protocol was 
signed in 1983 between Kyrgyz and Kazakh SSRs. It focused  on sharing and regulation of water 
resources and hydraulic infrastructure between the two republics. This protocol was the first 
agreement regulating the Talas waterscape. According to the protocol, the Talas water flow was 
equally divided, 50% to each republic (Wegerich, 2008; Dukhovny and De Schutter, 2011; personal 
communication with the Chu-Talas Basin Agency, August 2015).  
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of different agricultural and economic plans 
between the two independent states, issues and tensions regarding water flow division and hydraulic 
infrastructure O&M emerged. In order to solve these disputes and develop mutually beneficial 
cooperation, an agreement, ‘On the Use and Management of Water Facilities in the Chu and Talas 
River Basins’, was signed in 2000. The Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments agreed to confirm the 
water amount division set during the Soviet Union, and also stipulated that both riparian states have 
to share O&M of water infrastructures that have intergovernmental status, a reference to the Kirov 
reservoir. The measures ratified through the agreement came into force in 2002.  
However, on the wave of the rising role of development organisations in Central Asian water 
management, starting in 2002 UNECE, UNESCAP and OSCE have decided to be actively involved 
in supporting and strengthening transboundary water cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan in the Talas and Chu waterscapes (UNESCAP, OSCE, UNECE, 2006). These 
organisations initiated, in partnership with Kyrgyz and Kazakh water authorities, the project 
‘Support for the Creation of a Commission on the Chu and Talas Rivers’ between Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, aimed at establishing an interstate basin commission and defining its procedures and 
costs for the exploitation and maintenance of water management infrastructure (Libert, 2014). 
Although water sharing agreements and procedures for water infrastructure O&M were already in 
place, ratified, and implemented, donors found the opportunity to sponsor transboundary water 
cooperation through a fruitful collaboration with riparian states authorities. In parallel, they saw a 
need for an active engagement in the interstate political and economic context. Therefore, new 
actors, most prominently UNECE, have become involved in order to influence and balance 
transboundary interstate power dynamics. 
In 2006, the project was successfully implemented, as Lipponen and Libert (2012) underlined, and 
the permanent bilateral Chu-Talas Commission was established. According to UNECE (2011a), the 
main activities of the Chu-Talas Commission focus on the approval of water resources allocation in 
the Chu and Talas waterscapes, the determination of measures to maintain water facilities for inter-
state use and provide for their capital repair, and the approval of a financing plan for the above 
measures. Since 2005, the ADB has also become directly involved in transboundary cooperation, 
particularly through the functions of the Secretariat and the creation of the Commission’s working 
groups (ADB, 2013). Reflecting on its involvement, and legitimising its engagement, the ADB 
highlighted the need to face different challenges regarding Central Asian waters, such as a weak 
knowledge base for water management, a lack of coordination on irrigation distribution, and an 
incomplete institutional framework for transboundary coordination (Panella, 2008). 
Furthermore, since 2008, with the aim of strengthening borderlands cooperation and supporting 
empowerment and participatory approaches in the Commission’s decision-making processes, 
UNECE and OSCE have renewed their involvement through the establishment of a new project, 
‘Developing Cooperation on the Chu and Talas River Basins’ (UNECE, 2011b, Lipponen and 
Libert, 2012). This initiative, developed in collaboration with the ADB and the SDC, aimed to 
include small canals in the agreement and to introduce IWRM principles in the framework of the 
Commission. Building upon their initial involvement in establishing WUAs in the 2000s, ADB and 
SDC later decided to support Talas waterscape development initiatives, due to the complementarity 
of their sponsored projects. In order to promote IWRM and formalise this approach, international 
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organisations decided to support the establishment of a transboundary basin council aimed at 
including, apart from state actors, NGOs and water users according to a participatory approach 
(UNECE, 2011a). However, the riparian states prevented the implementation of this initiative, 
which would have aligned with the donors’ international support to IWRM in Central Asia. In 2011 
a Donor Consultative Group was established to strengthen the support to the Commission (Libert, 
2014), as evidence of donor organisations’ maintenance of a shared vision on long-term 
development strategies. The next section discusses interstate power dynamics between riparian 
states, and the strategies, mostly deployed by Kazakh water authorities, that have hampered 
international development policies and their rationale (Figure 3). 
 
3. Power in the Talas waterscape 
International development organisations have the ability to exclusively use soft power (bargaining 
and discursive) due to the absence of a physical-territorial entity and linked material power. In order 
to understand the aims of UNECE and of the other donors in the establishment of the Chu-Talas 
Commission, it is relevant to point out that an interstate agreement between Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan has been in place since the 2000s, regulating the water flow and management of the 
main infrastructures. UNECE and the other donors, through the establishment of the Commission, 
the transboundary water council initiative, the inclusion of small water infrastructures in the 
framework, and other programs promoted over the last decade, have attempted to strengthen 
interstate relations between riparian states, as a way of creating a success story of (water) 
cooperation in Central Asia. These initiatives, developed in close collaboration with Kazakh and 
Kyrgyz water authorities at the national level, have been supported by a discourse oriented towards 
interstate cooperation, good governance, and IWRM pillars such as institutional integration, 
stakeholders empowerment, and participatory approaches in the decision-making processes, as well 
as sustainable development and economic valorisation of water resources. Therefore, it emerges that 
donors, through their initiatives and this set of development buzzwords, have combined the 
strategies of bargaining and discursive powers aimed at influencing policies and discourses in the 
framework of the Commission, and at the Kazakh and Kyrgyz national levels. It appears that these 
different strategies, undertaken by the donors, have also been deployed to hegemonise the Talas 
waterscape through the configuration of a homogenous institutional structure, characterised by 
balanced riparian state power, and dominated by the depoliticised international development 
rationale and discourse. 
However, the events of the last decade, and particularly over the last five years, reveal that complex 
dynamics have shaped the Talas waterscape institutional structure and the role of the Commission. 
Kazakhstan has dominated power relations between the riparian states. Kyrgyzstan has been 
oriented towards a decentralization of water management, reducing state control roles, and the 
establishment of WUAs supported by the WB since 2000, while Kazakhstan has recently moved 
towards a recentralization of its water sector (Sehring, 2009; Bichsel, 2009; Zinzani, 2014). 
Since 2012 the (water) ‘Republican State Enterprises’ (Kazvodkhoz, based at the provincial level 
and directly controlled by the Committee of Water Resources under the Ministry of Agriculture) 
have embodied the Kazakh district water departments (Kommunalnivodkhoz). The property regime 
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of infrastructures has been shifted from districts directly under the control of the state. And several 
WUAs have lost governmental support and subsequently failed, despite their formalization in 2004 
(personal communication with members of the Taraz Republican State Enterprise and the former 
Dzhambul District Water Department, September 2015). Following the dismantling of the 
Dzhambul Kommunalnivodkhoz, state water authorities are in charge of directly allocating water to 
users. As an employee of Grodikovo municipality and a farmer of Besagash stated, two WUAs 
operated in the district until 2012, when they filed for bankruptcy, and two other planned WUAs 
were not established due to administrative and bureaucratic issues. They also added that 
Kommunalnivodkhoz bureaucrats hampered this process, due to the unwillingness to lease 
infrastructures and to place a private intermediary entity between the authority and farmers. 
National discourses accompanied this process based on the strategic role of water and infrastructure, 
and the need of a more powerful role of the state in their management (Zinzani, 2017). Regarding 
the dismantling of the Kommunalnivodkhoz and the hydraulic infrastructural property regime 
change, members of the Taraz Kazvodkhoz argued that canals and water supply processes are 
strategic objectives that the state should manage exclusively. In addition, they pointed out that the 
decentralization of secondary canals control failed, both financially and technically. When asked 
about this matter, farmers in Grodikovo explained that decentralization did not lead to any benefits, 
and that the approach of creating WUAs failed. Other water users in Besagash and a former water 
master (also known as miraab) of Kommunalnivodkhoz agreed that state authorities should manage 
hydraulic infrastructures and that allocation, directly controlled by these institutions without any 
intermediaries, would be more efficient. 
The role of national hydraulic bureaucracies and their bargaining and discursive powers have also 
influenced contrasting processes between riparian states. Whereas those of Kazakhstan took 
advantage of the recentralisation, the instability and the various political reconfigurations that have 
occurred at the national level since 2005 have had a negative impact on the Kyrgyz hydraulic 
bureaucracies, which have lost bargaining power in riparian relations and negotiations. Kyrgyzstan 
seems to be the only state in Central Asia where state authorities, including members of hydraulic 
bureaucracies, have supported a policy of decentralization, despite the reduction of their bargaining 
power. Indeed, the director of the Manas District Water Department and two more members argued 
that, while the state should maintain the main infrastructures, WUAs should maintain secondary 
canals and small waterlines, as they belong to the people. They also added that the principle of 
decentralization and the idea that state and private institutions should operate together without 
conflicts of interests inspired the creation of the Saiza-Baisu WUAs Federation. However, these 
contrasting political reconfiguration processes between riparian states strengthened the 
asymmetrical relations, negotiations, and power. The following strategies and issues enable the 
understanding of the asymmetrical riparian relations between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the 
ability of Kazakh authorities to hegemonise transboundary water politics. 
Kazakh water authorities have successfully deployed their material and bargaining power to hamper 
and block the establishment of the Talas transboundary basin council, which donors have supported 
since 2011. Whereas members of the Kyrgyz Manas District Water Department underlined different 
challenges regarding the implied institutional change, but expressed their interest, the Kazakh 
members of the Commission stated – thus confirming the institutional challenge – that the council 
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was not established because it would have not led to any benefits for Kazakh water users or 
authorities (personal communication with the Kazakh secretariat of the Chu-Talas Commission, 
August 2015). The interviewed head of the Kazakh Chu-Talas Basin Water Organization also 
stressed that strengthening joint O&M of water facilities rather than focusing on IWRM principles 
and participatory approaches is a priority. Farmers interviewed in both Kyrgyz and Kazakh villages 
stated that they have never been informed about this initiative. Reflecting on the process, Kazakh 
members of the Commission and state water authorities influenced the non-establishment of the 
transboundary basin council, following their national path of supporting a centralised approach and 
limiting the role and powers of local and non-state stakeholders. 
Evidence from the borderlands identifies other processes that the joint Commission should have 
regulated in which Kazakh authorities profited from their material and bargaining power in 
negotiations with Kyrgyzstan. For example, the Talas river flow has been equally divided (50% - 
50%) between riparian states since 1983, and the agreement was renewed in the framework of the 
Commission. However, due to the location of some natural springs a few kilometres upstream of the 
Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, Kazakhstan receives additional water which flows downstream through 
three natural streams (Besagash, Mergalik, Kairma). In an interview, Kyrgyz WUAs heads and 
members of the Manas District Water Department complained that Kazakh authorities should pay 
for the additional water that flows in their territory; furthermore, they argued, the Commission 
should regulate this issue. Kyrgyz WUA members also argued that Kazakh authorities should 
financially contribute to remediate flooding issues along the Kozh canal and in parts of Maiska 
village.  
The head of Manas-C WUA argued that even if Kazakhstan receives water for free, its authorities 
immediately complain if the flow decreases. Moreover, the deputy of Maiska (who is also the 
former head of the Dikhan WUA), stated that he contacted the Talas River Basin Authority to put 
pressure on the Ministry and solve these issues in the framework of the Chu-Talas Commission. 
However, no answer was provided. Therefore, it appears that Kyrgyz members could not impose 
their position and negotiate the issue with their Kazakh counterparts, who argued that this water is 
priceless since it flows to their territory directly from springs and through natural streams. This 
situation enables us to understand the capacity of Kazakh water authorities to deploy their material 
and bargaining power to hamper and block Kyrgyz claims and avoid a riparian discussion at the 
interstate level.  
An analysis of borderlands transboundary infrastructures issues enables us to deeply understand 
how Kazakh water authorities have been able to deploy both material and bargaining power. Since 
the Kazakh water recentralization process, initiated in 2012, small transboundary canals have a 
double and conflicting property regime. They are managed by the state in Kazakhstan and by 
WUAs in Kyrgyzstan, which implies power and negotiation asymmetries between the riparian 
states. Specifically, the Maksat-A WUA owns and maintains the Kozh canal in the Kyrgyz area, 
upstream, while the Taraz Kazvodkhoz owns and manages it in the downstream Kazakh area 
(personal communications with members of the Taraz Kazvodkhoz and the head of the Maksat-A 
WUA, September 2015). Due to flooding in the Kyrgyz borderlands and riparian disputes for Kozh 
canal maintenance and renovations in the border part, Kyrgyz WUAs heads argued for the addition 
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of borderlands transboundary canals disputes resolution mechanisms to the framework of the 
Commission.  
A water master of the Taraz Kazvodkhoz, who operates on the canal, explained that technical 
maintenance and water allocation issues are frequently and that water masters are in contact with the 
director of Maksat-A WUA. However, an international agreement to resolve these issues is not 
possible because the canal is both private and state owned. The director of Maksat-A WUA stated 
that since the end of the Kyrgyz part of Kozh canal provides irrigation exclusively for Kazakh lands, 
Kazakhstan should have responsibility for this section. Nevertheless, Kazakh authorities argued that 
this part of the canal lies in the Kyrgyz territory, and this notwithstanding they are already 
financially supporting joined infrastructures in the framework of the Commission. According to a 
2011 joint report by UNECE, ADB, and the Commission, the Kozh canal should have been 
included in the interstate strategic infrastructures, but had not, despite the Kyrgyz WUAs heads’ 
repeated requests. Key informants, when asked about this issue, argued that on the one hand Kyrgyz 
members of the Commission may have ignored these demands in order not to question the existing 
status quo set by Kazakhstan, while on the other hand they do not have enough bargaining power to 
influence riparian politics and set the agenda, although their country lies upstream in the 
waterscape. Informants added that Kazakh water authorities have the capability and bargaining 
power to influence and control riparian debates, policies, and measures, despite the official 
symmetric institutional structure of the Chu-Talas Commission (Figure 4).  
Reflecting on the borderlands evidence, it is clear that the Kazakh water authorities (in the 
framework of the Commission and within the Taraz Kazvodkhoz), particularly over the last five 
years, have been able to deploy different heterogeneous strategies to influence or hamper policies, 
practices, and measures, exercising different forms of power to hegemonise hydropolitics both 
inside and outside the framework of the Commission. The Kazakh hegemonic strategy involved the 
deployment of mostly bargaining and material power, limiting the role of ideational power. Through 
its material power, characterised by its economic means, centralized state and political structure, 
and strengthened hydraulic bureaucracies, Kazakhstan deployed bargaining power. The capacity of 
influencing negotiations (unpaid stream water exceeding the 50% agreement), hampering initiatives 
(establishment of the transboundary basin council), and setting a political agenda by deciding which 
issues should be discussed and which ones should be ignored (transboundary infrastructures, 
specifically the Kozh canal) demonstrated this.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper critically examined transboundary water relations in the Talas waterscape, using the 
framework of the CHH and borderlands field-research to illustrate how Kazakh water authorities 
obtained a more favourable water allocation than existing water agreements with Kyrgyzstan would 
have given them. The current study found that Kazakhstan uses more than 50% of the water amount 
sharing allowed in the framework of the Chu-Talas Commission. Evidence from borderlands has 
shown that the country was able to hamper development initiatives and to set and influence the 
agenda regarding the management of small transboundary infrastructures. They have built this 
hydro-hegemony through a range of strategies. Kazakh water authorities, and their hydraulic 
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bureaucracies, have indeed used material and bargaining power to hegemonise hydropolitics in the 
Talas waterscape and to assert and consolidate their interests, limiting the power and initiatives of 
the international organisations and primarily UNECE, while also eroding interests, power, and 
needs of their direct counterpart, Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, Kazakh water authorities were also able 
to concurrently support a sustainability-driven and integrated vision in relation with donors, while 
maintaining a nationalistic, state-centred, and powerful vision towards Kazakh people and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Significantly, and in contrast with studies emphasising the role ideational power played in shaping 
transboundary water relations (Zeitoun et al., 2011; Menga, 2016a), we found that forms of material 
and bargaining power matter the most in the Talas transboundary waterscape. Arguably this reflects 
the rather local dimension of the debate as it was influenced by the Kazakhs, which managed to 
exert a capillary control of water negotiations throughout their officials, thus hampering broader 
initiatives UNECE had carried out and demands from Kyrgyzstan.  
This research considered water politics in the Talas waterscape as processes; further research could 
continue tracing the evolution of power symmetries (and asymmetries) in the region. Recent 
institutional developments, such as the ratification of the UNECE Water Convention and the related 
inclusion of several states, could play a greater role in the future, and their impact deserves further 
study. Despite our critical attitude towards the claims of success international development actors 
have made, we recognise that they may strengthen transboundary cooperation. However, while 
international organisations’ tend to portray the establishment of the Chu-Talas Commission as a 
success story, our research, through qualitative ethnographic field research at the borderlands level, 
illustrated local strategies, demands, claims, and power relations which question the narrated 
success story by international organisations. Furthermore, our evidence from the borderlands shows 
that the idea of creating a homogeneous and symmetric cooperation failed, and that Kazakhstan has 
been able, over the last five years, to build up its role as hydro-hegemon.  
A multi-scalar approach furthered our understanding of hydropolitics in the Talas waterscape, 
shedding light on the processes behind Kazakhstan’s emergence as hydro-hegemon, but also 
providing a novel theoretical contribution to the hydro-hegemony and water geography 
scholarships. Indeed, our adoption of the CHH together with a multi-scalar approach, showed that 
transboundary waterscapes are shaped, on the one hand, by a range of different scalar practices and 
strategies (which in certain cases are deployed by the same actor), and on the other hand they are 
also influenced by a variety of actors related to different spatial scales. This complex setting 
highlights the necessity, for both the hydro-hegemony and water geography literature, to pay more 
attention to the understanding of evolving political processes and spatial strategies of actors ranging 
from the international level, - e.g. development organisations - to the local one, including 
borderlands communities. The multi-scalar use of diverse power strategies emerged from our 
findings enables us to advance the analysis and the understanding of the multi layered nature of 
hydro-hegemony. 
Further research could also explore how, in different settings and at different levels, heterogeneous 
forms of power might be used by the Kazakh authorities to influence transboundary water 
negotiations. While we recognised that ideational power plays only a marginal role in the Talas 
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waterscape, this could not be the case in the larger Syr-Darja River basin, which Kazakhstan shares 
with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Transboundary water issues in this basin are widely 
contested and politicised, and Kazakhstan apparently keeps a lower profile (at least concerning 
water politics), but further studies need to be carried out to dig beneath the surface of transboundary 
water relations. Multiple levels of analysis, not only of Central Asian waterscapes, need to be 
carefully considered, and their interrelation with the use of power still deserves to be explored. 
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Figure 1. The Circle of Hydro-Hegemony. 
Figure 2. GIS elaboration of a satellite image (Nasa-Modis 1999) representing the transboundary 
Talas waterscape.  
Figure 3. GIS elaboration of a satellite image (Google Earth TM) representing the Talas waterscape, 
and specifically its borderlands where ethnographic field research was conducted.  
Figure 4. Wielding Power: The Five Tactics Forming the Kazakh Hegemonic Strategy in the Talas 
waterscape in the Period 2011-2015. 
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